The Lab-Grown Brain Makes Philosophy (poem)

It is material to our essential understanding of power, if in defining good and evil we first grant that neither without what we will term actionability, is able to escape the formlessness of thought, taking thought as both a prompt to the accessing of images stored in memory, and images created from fragments of other memories; thus thought must obtain power, if we are at this reductive stage to assume that power is always a motive force, however feeble, and therefore that thought, crystalizing from the stematic urge-state, into this making of pictures, which in theory may spur a rudimentary consciousness of a change in being-sense, what we may characterize to ourselves (bearing in mind we are in this example, and for the purposes of this discursion, the egg, or cell), as an idea, or more accurately, the building-blocks of an idea; then we may, conditionally, call thought a type of power, from which foundation we may fairly return to the question of whether power is capable of judging the qualities of power; whether lesser power has the greater or lesser perspective to make determination as to the nature of greater or lesser powers than itself; however not disallowing the potential for such weaknesses to distort, if not to undermine, our apprehension of any superficial differences which would permit the raising of the debate, as to a simple system of labeling, one in which we would designate this object good, and that object bad, merely for the purpose of evaluating, by so distinguishing the two, whether the one can be identified by a property to which we may attach a short-term supposition of general positiveness; in contrast, then, we would seek to evaluate the qualities of this second object, whereupon we ask ourselves to consider relative positiveness, in and of itself, and whether this achieves a congelation either beyond reasonable dispute as to be named positive, or whether it furnishes such dramatic tendencies as to oppose; ergo we shall be comfortable in calling this negative, and having taken ourselves through the process up to the point of feeling convinced of the duality of the contrasting objects, we must question whether this duality in itself defies comparison, thus to say we have two objects, in their separate realizations; the good must then have a greater motive force than the bad, if to be deemed by this standard alone, superior.